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in	malware	 that	 targets	 Point	 of	 Sale	 (POS)	 systems	 and	 it	 has	 been	 hugely	 successful	 in	
exfiltrating	 large	 amounts	of	 valuable	payment	 information	 that	 can	be	 sold	on	 the	black	
market.	 In	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 cases,	malware	 needs	 to	 communicate	with	 some	 control	
mechanism	or	human	controller	in	order	to	coordinate	attacks,	maintain	lists	of	compromised	






used	 to	 shadow	 legitimate	 network	 traffic	 by	 observing	 network	 packets	 leaving	 a	 host	
machine	(piggybacking),	the	use	of	statistical	modelling	such	as	the	Poisson	distribution	and	
a	 dynamic	 Poisson	 distribution	model	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 further	 conceal	malicious	 DNS	
activity	within	a	network.	The	results	obtained	from	this	work	show	that	current	DNS-based	























in	 responding	 to	DNS	queries	 can	have	an	observable	 impact	 for	 end	users	 and	 so	 in	 the	
majority	of	cases,	DNS	logging	is	switched	off	in	favour	of	increased	performance.	
	
Malware	developers	are	all	 too	aware	of	 the	dependence	on	DNS	and	the	difficulties	 that	
organisations	can	have	 in	monitoring	and	harvesting	useful	 security	 intelligence	 from	DNS	
traffic	 logs.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	malware	 that	
exploits	 the	 DNS	 system	 (Brook	 2015.).	 Recent	 studies	 of	 malware	 such	 as	 MULTIGRAIN	
(Lynch,	Andonov,	Teodorescu	2016),	that	target	Windows-based	Point-of-Sale	(POS)	systems	
provide	clear	evidence	that	DNS	can	be	used	to	exfiltrate	large	amounts	of	valuable	payment	
data.	 Systems	 that	 process	 card	 data	 will	 often	 restrict,	 or	 entirely	 block	 HTTP	 and	 FTP	
network	protocols	that	are	used	for	data	exfiltration.		While	network	protocols	such	as	HTTP	
and	 FTP	 may	 be	 disabled	 within	 a	 restrictive	 card	 processing	 environment,	 DNS	 is	 still	





as	 a	 series	 of	 encoded	DNS	queries.	 Like	most	malware	 that	 exploits	DNS,	MULTIGRAIN’s	
persistence	relies	on	the	assumption	that	system	administrators	are	far	too	busy	monitoring	
HTTP,	 FTP	 and	 other	 network	 protocols	 to	worry	 about	 DNS.	 In	 this	 paper,	we	 suggest	 a	





host	machine.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	Poisson	based	query	 schedule	we	 implement	 a	querying	
strategy	 that	 piggybacks	 legitimate	 outbound	 DNS	 queries	 leaving	 the	 system	 and	 we	




The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organised	 as	 follows.	 In	 section	 2,	 we	 describe	 the	 basic	
mechanisms	 that	need	 to	be	 in	place	 in	order	 to	communicate	using	DNS	queries	and	we	
outline	 some	of	 the	constraints	and	 limitations	 in	using	 the	DNS	system	as	a	C2	and	data	
exfiltration	channel.	In	section	3,	we	analyse	a	four	day	long	Passive	DNS	log	and	show	how	
the	arrival	times	of	DNS	queries	resemble	a	Poisson	arrival	process	and	in	particular	how	the	




sends	outbound	DNS	queries	when	 it	detects	 legitimate	DNS	activity,	 thereby	blending	 its	
malicious	 traffic	 with	 benign	 traffic.	 In	 section	 4,	 we	 compare	 and	 contrast	 the	 data	
exfiltration	capabilities,	in	particular	stealthiness	and	throughput,	of	each	of	the	DNS	query	






In	 this	 section,	 we	 discuss	 the	 mechanisms	 required	 to	 carry	 out	 DNS-based	 covert	



























might	 represent	 an	 atomic	 piece	 of	 payment	 information	 such	 as	 a	 16-digit	 credit	 card	
number	 plus	 a	 4-digit	 expiry	 date	 and	 a	 3-digit	 CCV	 number.	 In	 this	 case,	 there	 is	 no	





regular	 beacon	messages	 to	 C2	 servers	 to	 alert	 them	 of	 their	 existence	 and	 to	 check	 for	
updates	or	 instructions	 from	cyber	 criminals.	Work	 carried	out	by	 Shalaginov,	 Franke	and	
 
 




for	payment	 information	approximately	every	5	minutes	which	 should	 result	 in	a	periodic	
increase	in	DNS	activity.	The	periodicity	of	DNS-based	covert	channel	beacons	represents	a	




According	 to	 RFC	 1035	 (Mockapetris	 1987),	 domain	 names	 can	 contain	 the	 set	 of	
alphanumeric	characters	a-z,	A-Z,	0-9	and	can	include	the	hyphen	symbol	but	domain	names	
cannot	start	or	end	with	a	hyphen.	Although	domain	names	can	contain	both	upper	and	lower	







protocol,	 it	must	 first	be	encoded	using	base32	or	 some	other	encoding	 scheme	 that	will	
translate	data	(binary	or	text)	into	the	limited	character	set	allowed	by	the	DNS	protocol.	The	
observation	of	strangely	encoded	long	DNS	queries	can	in	themselves	be	a	tell	tail	sign	that	
DNS-based	C2	and	data	exfiltration	 is	occurring	 (Born	and	Gustafson	2010).	However,	 this	





unlikely	 that	 DNS	 would	 be	 a	 malware	 developers	 first	 choice	 in	 selecting	 a	 covert	







Malware	 that	 is	 designed	 to	 exfiltrate	 valuable	 information	 over	 DNS	 must	 maximise	 its	
throughput	 while	 ensuring	 that	 DNS	 traffic	 is	 not	 increased	 to	 levels	 that	 might	 raise	
suspicion.	 In	 terms	 of	 C2	 and	 data	 exfiltration,	 the	 relationship	 between	 throughput	 and	
stealth	 is	 inversely	proportional	 in	 that	an	 increase	 in	 throughput	will	 increase	 the	 risk	of	







on	a	particular	 system	 in	order	 to	develop	 techniques	 that	will	 camouflage	malicious	DNS	
traffic.	 In	 section	 3.1	 of	 this	 paper	 we	 analyse	 4	 days	 of	 legitimate	 DNS	 traffic	 that	 was	

























Traffic	 that	 is	 machine-initiated	 or	 timer	 driven,	 such	 as	 MULTIGRAIN’s	 ~5min	 payment	
exfiltration	schedule,	will	not	strictly	adhere	to	exponentially	distributed	inter	arrival	times.	
Therefore,	DNS-based	C2	and	data	exfiltration	schedules	should	ensure	that	inter	arrival	times	
are	 exponentially	 distributed	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 stealthiness	 and	 avoid	 detection.	 The	
















to	 resemble	 delays	 observed	 in	 some	 baseline	 traffic	measurement.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	observe	legitimate	DNS	traffic	in	order	to	calculate	the	mean	delay	between	DNS	
queries.	 The	 mean	 delay	 can	 then	 be	 used	 to	 generate	 an	 exponential	 distribution	 that	




Count	 Mean	 Std	Dev	 Min	 Max	 25%	 50%	 75%	
8048	 18.5	 248	 0	 7231	 0.01	 0.9	 9	
Using	the	data	gathered	in	table	1,	 it	 is	possible	to	schedule	covert	DNS	queries	with	inter	
packet	delays	drawn	from	an	exponential	distribution	with	a	rate	of	l = 18.5.	Figure	3,	shows	




While(bytes left to exfiltrate){ 
Encode and send DNS exfil packet 
Randomly select time delay T from 
distribution 






















Create a small circular buffer 
containing initial exponential 
distribution 
While(bytes left to-exfiltrate){ 
Encode and send DNS exfil packet 
Randomly select time delay T from 
distribution 
Observe actual DNS traffic for 
time T, calculate inter packet 












and	 data	 exfiltration	 correlates	 with	 normal	 traffic	 patterns.	 The	 advantage	 to	 using	 this	
approach	is	that	malware	developers	do	not	have	to	create	traffic	models	that	resemble	an	
infected	 machines	 normal	 behaviour.	 The	 throughput	 of	 the	 “piggybacking”	 approach	 is	
heavily	dependent	of	the	level	of	network	activity	on	the	host	machine.	If	the	host	machine	











In	our	first	experiment,	we	tested	a	fixed	exponential	distribution	with	l = 18.5 over the course 
of one hour. At the end of testing, 895 DNS-based data exfiltration queries left the host machine 
giving a communication ratio of 1:5 with legitimate DNS queries during the same time period. 
 
 
As can be seen in figure 5(a), data exfiltration queries are randomly distributed and 
significantly lower than legitimate DNS queries. The data exfiltration DNS queries are well 
camouflaged by legitimate traffic but the throughput is quite low, particularly at ~40mins where 
legitimate DNS activity is high. Figure 5(b) represents another hour-long experiment using the 
“Piggyback” blending technique. In this case, 3190 data exfiltration queries are sent giving a 
ratio of 1:1 with legitimate DNS queries. It is clear from figure 5(b) that there is a very close 
correlation between the timing of data exfiltration DNS queries and legitimate traffic. This is a 
useful feature in terms of stealthy behaviour. However, piggybacking high levels of legitimate 
traffic so closely exposes more data exfiltration traffic for analysis. In effect, every time a 












exfiltration	 pattern	 that	 resembles	 legitimate	 traffic	 up	 to	 a	 ~40mins	 where	 there	 is	 a	
significant	spike	in	exfiltration	traffic.	The	spike	in	exfiltration	traffic	correlates	with	a	spike	in	
legitimate	 traffic	 but	 is	 far	 higher	 which	 explains	 the	 4:1	 ratio	 of	 exfiltration	 packets	 to	
legitimate	packets.	This	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	buffer	started	to	fill	with	smaller	
inter	 packet	 deltas	 as	 the	 legitimate	 DNS	 traffic	 spiked	 and	 as	 the	 legitimate	 DNS	 traffic	
decreased	 the	 buffer	 was	 not	 updated	 with	 longer	 inter	 packet	 deltas	 fast	 enough	 so	
exfiltration	traffic	continued	to	spike.	As	can	be	seen	in	figure	6(b),	a	buffer	size	of	500	results	
in	exfiltration	traffic	volume	that	is	higher	than	legitimate	traffic,	with	a	ratio	of	2:1,	but	does	

















average	 over	 5	 runs	 and	 while	 the	 Poisson	 and	 dynamic	 Poisson	 exfiltrate	 179	 and	 270	









The	Poisson	 schedule	with	l = 18.5, exfiltrates the least packets but its throughput should 
remain constant regardless of the level of network activity on the host machine. If the host 
machines actual network activity levels have a mean DNS query rate of 18.5, then this approach 
should offer a moderate throughput while keeping exfiltration queries at a stealthy level. 
However, if the host machines network activity levels are significantly different to the mean 
used for the fixed exponential distribution then the traffic trend line for exfiltration packets will 
 
 
not blend with actual network activity. This will lead to far too many exfiltration packets 
leaving the host machine, or a less than efficient throughput. 
The dynamic exponential distribution schedule, using a circular buffer of size 1000 has a 
throughput that lies between the other traffic blending approaches. As this approach observes 
legitimate DNS queries it has the ability to adapt throughput and as a result stealthiness, based 
on the level of network activity on the host machine. As stated in section 4.2, the size of the 
buffer will determine how sensitive the exfiltration schedule is to legitimate spikes in DNS 
traffic. Using a dynamic exponential distribution to control delays between exfiltration queries 















As	 an	 extension	 of	 this	 work	 we	 plan	 to	 carry	 out	 further	 experiments	 to	 gain	 a	 better	
understanding	of	how	the	circular	buffer	size	effects	data	throughput	and	stealthiness.	It	may	
also	be	possible	to	alter	the	circular	buffer	size	algorithmically	so	that	it	adapts	to	legitimate	
DNS	traffic	patterns	over	time.	
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